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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to 
produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s important health 
policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength of findings and exposing 
gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decision-makers reliable information and new insights to 
inform complex policy decisions. For more information about the Synthesis Project, visit the Synthesis 
Project’s Web site at www.policysynthesis.org. For additional copies of Synthesis products, please go 
to the Project’s Web site or send an e-mail request to pubsrequest@rwjf.org.
As the policy debate over the medical malpractice insurance crisis continues, dueling claims about 
its causes and suggestions for policy solutions have highlighted the need for a better understand-
ing of how medical malpractice insurance works, why premiums change and what can be done 
about it. This policy primer provides a basic description of these issues, focusing on the following 
questions:
• How does medical malpractice insurance work?
• How much do we spend on the medical malpractice system?
• What is a medical malpractice “crisis”?
• What causes malpractice crises?
This Primer is one in a series of reports addressing medical malpractice insurance issues. The  
series also includes a Research Synthesis and Policy Brief analyzing research evidence on  
how the medical malpractice crisis has affected health care delivery and the impact of state  
tort reforms. 
How does medical malpractice insurance work? 
Most health care providers need to buy professional liability insurance. Nearly all 
states require that physicians have liability insurance. Even in states that don’t, physicians usually 
have to have insurance coverage in order to get privileges to see patients at a hospital. In some 
contexts, however, physicians can choose to “go bare.” In Florida, for example, it is estimated that 
about five percent of physicians carry no liability coverage (17). 
Physicians usually buy their insurance from a commercial company or a physician-owned mutual 
company, either individually or through a group practice. Hospitals and other health care facilities 
purchase their own insurance, and hospitals that directly employ physicians typically buy a policy 
that covers both the hospital and its medical staff. Physicians employed by the federal govern-
ment don’t buy insurance; if they are sued, the suit is brought against the federal government, 
which insures itself. Some state-employed physicians receive coverage from the state.
Premiums for malpractice insurance vary with the provider’s degree of risk, but 
experience rating is not widely used. Insurers set premiums on a prospective basis based 
on: 1) their expected payouts for providers in a particular risk group; 2) the uncertainty surround-
ing this estimate; 3) their expected administrative expenses and future investment income; and 4) 
the profit rate they seek. They use information on past losses and expenses, combined with other 
information, to help them set rates. 
Physician professional liability insurance does not work like auto insurance, which is generally 
experience rated. When a motorist has a claim, his insurance premiums go up. Physician mal-
practice premiums, by contrast, are usually priced according to the physician’s specialty and 
geographic location only (some insurers also consider number of hours worked and types and  
setting of work within the specialty). Experiments with individual experience rating have not 
worked because physicians’ claims experience is too variable over short time periods, making it 
difficult to produce an actuarially stable estimate of their risk. 
For hospitals, some degree of experience rating occurs, but usually no more than 25 percent of 
the hospital’s total premium is based on experience. Experience rating hospitals is more feasible 
than experience rating physicians because hospitals’ claims experience is more stable over time. 
Hospital premiums also vary with hospital location (e.g., urban versus rural) and the clinical ser-
vices offered (e.g., level of trauma care).
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On average, it takes four to five years to resolve a claim from the date of an incident 
(23). In many states, plaintiffs can wait two or three years after discovery of an injury that allegedly 
resulted from malpractice to file a claim. This long tail means that insurers have a lot of uncertainty 
about what their liability ultimately will be. The difficulty of estimating liability for claims that have 
not yet been brought or resolved makes it hard for insurers to set premiums accurately. 
Although recently a federal legislative issue, like most kinds of insurance,  
malpractice insurance is regulated primarily by the states. State insurance  
commissioners regulate rates to ensure that they are not excessive, inadequate or unfairly  
discriminatory. Variations in this state-specific regulation are one reason that premiums may  
go up (or down) in some states and not in others.
State departments of insurance follow one of six types of insurance regulation for medical liability 
insurance (Figure 1). Some make it harder than others for insurers to change their prices (23).  
Even within these six statutory approaches, there can be significant variation in the actual amount 
of oversight by the insurance commissioner. The commissioner may be relatively stringent or 
lenient in approving rate changes and more or less diligent in reviewing submitted materials. 
Figure 1. State approaches to medical malpractice insurance regulation
Insurance regulation approach How it works
Most 
restrictive
Least 
restrictive
Prior approval Insurers must file proposed rate changes with the state and 
obtain approval before the changes can be implemented (17 
states in 2004).
Modified prior approval Requires prior state approval for rate revisions based on a 
change in the insurer’s expense ratio.
Flex rating Requires prior approval only if the rates exceed a certain 
percentage above (and sometimes below) the previous 
rates.
File and use Requires that insurers notify the state of rates prior to their 
use, but does not require specific approval (23 states).
Use and file Requires that the state be notified after rate changes are 
implemented (9 states).
No file Requires insurers to maintain records of information used 
in developing their rates, but does not require them to file 
notice of their rates with the state. 
Source: Nordman et al., 2004. Source does not list the number of states using the modified prior approval, no file, or flex  
rating regime.
Rate regulation may have an important influence on insurance prices, but whether 
it raises or lowers them is not clear. In theory, regulation could keep prices higher or lower 
than they would be in an unregulated market. Prices could be higher if regulators set price floors 
in an effort to protect consumers against companies becoming insolvent because they dropped 
their rates too low and incurred liability they couldn’t pay for. They could be lower if regulators 
refused to approve rate hikes in response to pressure from consumers to make insurance more 
affordable. Studies of auto insurance have provided support for both these hypotheses (6). No 
comparable studies of the professional liability insurance markets are available.
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Several important recent shifts in the liability insurance market have affected how 
much health care providers pay for insurance and the amount of exposure they face. 
Exit of some commercial carriers and advent of physician mutuals—Physician-owned-and-
operated companies (mutuals) sprang up in the 1970s and 1980s to fill gaps left by the exit 
of commercial carriers. Mutuals may offer lower rates than commercials and give physicians 
greater control. Some mutuals with little underwriting expertise have faltered during hard 
markets, however,
Problems obtaining affordable reinsurance after September 11—Reinsurance, which covers losses 
above a specified threshold, helps organizations limit their exposure in a given year. Reinsurance 
has become more expensive for both self-insured hospitals and insurers during the most recent 
malpractice crisis. Along with other factors, the catastrophic losses that reinsurers suffered on 
September 11 made reinsurance more expensive. When reinsurance costs more, primary insurers’ 
profits decline unless they pass along the increase to those they insure. 
The growth of hospital self-insurance—Instead of opting for commercial insurance, many hospitals 
are forming captives (companies that are wholly owned by a single health care facility or hospital 
system) and other self-insurance arrangements in order to exert greater control over rates and 
leave a risk pool that includes higher-risk facilities. The downside is that self-insured hospitals 
tend to retain more risk, particularly if they have trouble finding affordable reinsurance. Also,  
prices in the commercial market may increase when lower-risk members leave the pool.
Shift from occurrence policies, which cover all incidents in the policy year regardless of when the 
claim is filed, to claims-made policies, which cover only claims filed in the policy year—Coverage 
is more meager under a claims-made policy; it leaves a long tail of exposure for incidents that 
haven’t yet become claims. Most physicians purchase costly tail policies to cover these incidents, 
in addition to paying for a claims-made policy. 
Increasing interest in hospitals buying insurance for doctors—By affiliating more closely with 
hospitals, some physicians have been able to find a stable, relatively low-cost source of  
insurance. This trend has widened the disparities between physicians who practice in large-
group settings and those in small-group or solo practice settings, who are more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in overhead costs. 
The growth of joint underwriting associations (JUAs) and patient compensation funds (PCFs)— 
JUAs are state-mandated insurers of last resort for physicians who cannot find insurance on the 
market. If the JUA’s losses exceed the premiums it collects, other insurers in the state are required 
by law to contribute toward covering them. PCFs are state funds that operate like an excess-
layer insurer—that is, if a judgment exceeds the physician’s primary policy limit, the PCF pays 
the amount above the limit (or the amount between the limit and another statutorily-prescribed 
amount). They are funded by mandatory surcharges that physicians and hospitals pay on their  
primary-layer policies. These arrangements give primary insurers, physicians, and hospitals an 
extra cushion against large judgments, but impose additional costs that may be hard to bear in 
times of crisis. 
Relatively poor returns on investment since 2000—Insurers invest much of the premiums they 
collect. Their portfolios tend to look fairly similar, typically consisting of about 80 percent bonds, 
10 percent stock, 5 –10 percent cash and a smattering of other investments (23). These relatively 
conservative portfolios are required by law in most states. Even these portfolios, however, are  
vulnerable to swings in the equity and bond markets. Insurers, like other investors, have enjoyed 
less favorable rates of return on their investments since 2000. Median investment income among 
insurers with 50 percent or more of their business in malpractice insurance dropped 52.7 percent 
from 2000 to 2002, from $4.5 million to $2.1 million, with investment yields dropping from 5.2 per-
cent to 4.3 percent (23). This drop looks large, and is often cited as a leading reason for increases 
in insurance premiums. It is important, however, to remember that investment income is only a 
small part of total insurer income (23).
How much do we spend on the malpractice system?
Much has been said in the policy debate about the toll that malpractice litigation 
takes on the economy, but hard cost estimates are elusive. To calculate the total costs 
of the malpractice system one would need reliable estimates of both the direct and the indirect 
costs. The direct costs of malpractice litigation include payments made on claims (from which 
plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs are taken), legal costs of defending claims and costs of under-
writing and administering liability insurance. A recent estimate suggests that claims costs amounted 
to $4.4 billion in 2001, legal defense costs amounted to $1.4 billion and insurance administration 
amounted to $700 million. Thus, total direct costs were probably about $6.5 billion in 2001, or 0.46 
percent of total health care spending (2). These and all estimates of the costs of the malpractice 
system, however, are back-of-the-envelope calculations; no hard cost figures are available.
Indirect costs arise when the liability system causes physicians to supply more health care  
services than they would in the absence of a liability threat. Services that are provided primarily  
or solely for the purposes of protecting physicians against malpractice liability, rather than the 
medical benefit of the patient, are referred to as defensive medicine. True defensive-medicine 
costs are properly counted as indirect costs of the malpractice system, but the costs of additional 
appropriate (i.e., medically indicated) services should not be included in that estimate. 
There are no reliable estimates of the national costs of defensive medicine. Many 
analysts have attempted to estimate these costs; all have failed to do so reliably. All of the avail-
able measurement methodologies have serious shortcomings (10, 18). For example, some national 
estimates are based on the incremental cost increases associated with just two or three medical 
procedures or diagnoses. It is simply not possible to extrapolate so widely to other procedures, 
because some are more amenable to defensive medical practice than others. The Office of Tech-
nology Assessment conducted a comprehensive review of the evidence about defensive medicine 
costs in 1994 and concluded that none of available estimates were reliable (32). Much additional 
research has been conducted since then, but the conclusion remains the same. 
Malpractice litigation costs and total health care spending are related, but not  
precisely. Because the cost of medical care for injured patients is a large component of mal-
practice awards, we should expect awards to rise along with increases in health care spending. 
Indeed, both average paid claims and per-capita health spending grew 52 percent in real terms 
from 1991 and 2003 (14 and spending data from Centers on Medicare and Medicaid Services). 
Malpractice awards also include other components, however, such as non-economic damages,  
so we should not expect them to precisely track health care spending. 
What is a medical malpractice “crisis”?
Stakeholder groups disagree about whether the current environment should be 
labeled a “crisis,” but there is general agreement that malpractice insurance has 
become less affordable and available. A malpractice crisis is a period of volatility in the 
medical professional liability insurance market in which deterioration in insurance carriers’ financial 
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ratios is followed by higher-than-historical increases in insurance premiums and/or decreased 
supply of insurance. The use of the word “crisis” is controversial because of the severity and 
urgency it connotes, but the term is widely used in the academic scholarship as well as policy 
debates. Further details about the current crisis period and previous crises are provided below. 
When evaluating whether a state is experiencing a medical malpractice crisis, one should look at 
both absolute levels of premiums (Figure 2) and the amount of change from year to year. It is also 
important to juxtapose these costs with how generously providers are reimbursed in the state, as 
reimbursement affects providers’ ability to meet rising insurance costs. 
Figure 2. Average liability premiums for OBGYNs in select “crisis” and “non-crisis” states, 1993–2002
Source: weighted average premium (weighted by insurer market share and population) for a standard primary-layer policy for obste-
trician-gynecologists, calculated from data reported in the Medical Liability Monitor Annual Rate Survey and in National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners’ 2004 report by Nordman and Cernak. Where applicable, premiums also include mandatory surcharge 
to state patient compensation fund. All dollar values were adjusted to 2003 dollars using the GDP deflator. Pennsylvania, Florida and 
Nevada are “in crisis,” and California, Colorado and Wisconsin are “currently OK” according to the American Medical Association.
Malpractice crises are state-specific phenomena. There are several reasons crises tend 
to affect states rather than regions or the entire country. First of all, sociodemographic variations 
across states make for very different tort environments in terms of litigiousness and average 
award size. In addition, the rules governing malpractice litigation vary across states, malpractice 
insurance is regulated predominantly by the states and many malpractice insurers serve only  
one or a small number of states. Current and recent proposals for federal tort reform such as a  
nationwide cap on noneconomic damages represent a substantial departure from an uninterrupted 
historical tradition of state control over this area of law. 
There are several indicators that a state is entering a malpractice crisis:
Deteriorating financial performance of insurers. Deteriorating financial statistics (Figure 3) are 
typically the earliest indication of a malpractice crisis. Over time, insurers should adjust their 
premiums or underwriting practices to correct problems with profitability. If they raise prices 
sufficiently, the crisis will be resolved for insurers before it is over for health care providers. 
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Currently, there are signs that insurers’ financial ratios in many states are stabilizing and some 
insurers plan no further large increases. But because premiums remain at much higher levels than 
they were before the crisis, providers perceive the crisis to be ongoing.
Figure 3. Measuring insurers’ financial performance
Financial statistic Explanation
Loss ratio The ratio of expected liability on claims to dollars collected in premiums.
Combined ratio A statistic similar to the loss ratio that incorporates information about the insurer’s 
administrative expenses.
Incurred losses The insurer’s estimate of the total value of all claims relating to the policy year.
Operating ratio A measure comparing premium and investment income to the insurer’s loss costs 
and expenses.
Paid losses The actual losses paid by the insurer during the policy year.
Decreased availability of insurance. One flavor of malpractice crisis is a crisis of availability: insur-
ers exit the market, deciding it is not profitable enough or is too volatile and unpredictable (22). 
Alternatively, insurers get tougher with underwriting—they decline to renew policies for doctors who 
have experienced a claim, do not write any new policies, or write new policies only for the best risks. 
Withdrawal of insurers was characteristic of the first malpractice crisis, in 1974–1976, when several 
companies exited the malpractice insurance markets in certain states. (That problem was corrected 
by the entrance of many new, physician-owned mutuals (27).) It is also characteristic of the current 
malpractice crisis. In December 2001, St. Paul’s, the largest malpractice insurer, withdrew from the 
market. Two other important sources of insurance, PHICO and Frontier Insurance Group, also left, 
and the Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (MIIX) decided to write business only in New Jersey (16). 
Government may respond to availability problems with special insurance programs such as joint 
underwriting associations, but if physicians are having to turn to these programs, which are typi-
cally more expensive than admitted carriers, it’s usually a sign of a problem in the market (23). 
Large premium increases. A crisis of affordability occurs when premium costs increase substan-
tially relative to their historical rate of increase (22, 28). Often this is related to insurers exiting 
the market; those remaining charge more. However, it may occur even with a stable supply of 
insurance. Affordability problems characterized the second malpractice crisis, in the mid-1980s, 
and the current crisis. Premiums have been rising in many states since 1999, with some leveling in 
2004 (Figure 2). Crises of affordability tend to vary not just across states but also within states by 
region (urban areas may experience greater increases than rural areas) and clinical specialty (most 
affected are obstetrics-gynecology, neurosurgery, general surgery, other surgical subspecialties, 
radiology, orthopedics and emergency medicine). 
Provider inability to pass on higher insurance costs to payers: To understand how rising insurance 
costs are affecting health care providers, it is important to examine both the size of premium  
increases and what is happening to provider reimbursement. If physicians and hospitals can 
charge more when their overhead costs increase, there will be no crisis from their perspective.  
If this pass-through of costs is not possible—for example because a single payer has a dominant 
market share and refuses to negotiate on this point—then premium hikes hurt providers more. 
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Compared to previous malpractice crises, the current era is characterized by greater use of  
non-fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements and greater payer consolidation. As a result, it 
is likely much harder for providers to negotiate upward adjustments in reimbursement. Moreover, 
Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement has been flat or declining for the last several years. The 
combination of lower income and higher overhead creates a squeeze on providers. 
Problems with the malpractice system persist even as malpractice crises come 
and go. There is enduring dissatisfaction with the medical liability system. Upswings in premiums 
bring these complaints into sharper relief, pushing the policy debate in the direction of sweeping 
reform rather than tinkering around the edges. Complaints about the system span its performance 
on several measures:
• The system does a poor job compensating patients injured by medical malpractice. Epidemio-
logical studies of medical injury and malpractice claiming suggest that only about two percent 
of injuries due to medical negligence become malpractice claims (12, 30). 
• The system has high transaction costs. For every dollar paid in malpractice insurance premiums, 
only about 40 cents goes to injured patients (15). The remainder is absorbed by insurers’  
administrative expenses and litigation expenses. Compared to other compensation systems 
that rely on administrative rather than legal processes to direct compensation to injured 
people, such as Social Security Disability Insurance or worker’s compensation, these transaction 
costs are extremely high. 
• Awards in malpractice cases are inequitable. Many plaintiffs with meritorious claims receive 
nothing, while others receive awards that seem disproportionate to the severity of their injury. 
Moreover, plaintiffs with similar injuries receive quite different awards, even in the same juris-
diction (8, 29). 
• The system focuses on the misdeeds of individual healthcare providers, but medical errors 
are often due to breakdowns in whole systems of care. There is no systems orientation in the 
liability system, despite the growing awareness of the role of systems in patient safety (11). It is 
difficult to hold a hospital or other healthcare system liable for a medical error so malpractice 
awards are usually levied against individual physicians. 
• There is no real evidence that the medical liability system deters negligent care. The tort system 
tends to be defended primarily on the basis of its deterrent effect, but the available evidence 
suggests that deterrence of medical error is limited at best (20). 
• The system has perverse effects on patient safety initiatives. Rather than deterring error, a 
heated liability environment may actually impede patient safety improvement by discouraging 
physicians from participating in initiatives such as adverse event reporting which may help  
analysts learn why medical errors occur (19, 25). 
Patient safety advocates contend that the current focus on tort reform does 
nothing to address the real “malpractice crisis”: medical errors. 
Groups that are concerned with patient rights and patient safety contend that the current policy 
focus on tort reform and calming insurance markets misses the real malpractice crisis, which is  
the high prevalence of error in medicine. Today’s malpractice crisis differs from previous crises 
in that there is a greater public understanding of how often medical error occurs. The Institute of 
Medicine’s 2000 report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, brought wide attention 
to the issue, estimating that 44,000 to 98,000 hospital deaths per year are attributed to medical errors. 
Understanding medical malpractice insurance: A primer | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT NO. 8 | 7 
What is a medical malpractice “crisis”?
The new focus on medical errors has changed the tenor of the policy debate about malprac-
tice. Providers have a relatively more difficult time making the case that malpractice litigation 
is unreasonable (21) and there is a greater demand for reforms that are also safety-enhancing 
(26). The focus on patient safety has also led state legislators and federal regulators to impose 
disclosure requirements of adverse events to patients. This raises the stakes of the malpractice 
crisis for health care providers because widespread disclosure would result in a bigger pool of 
patients who are aware that they suffered an adverse event and may decide to sue. In short, the 
patient safety movement has affected both the malpractice environment and the kinds of policy 
responses that the public is willing to support. 
What causes malpractice crises?
Stakeholder groups have rallied behind one of two genesis stories. Physician, hospital 
and insurer organizations usually characterize the malpractice crisis as being due to rising litiga-
tion costs. They argue that the last few years have seen large increases in the average amount 
paid out on claims (claim severity), the number of claims filed (claims frequency), or both. In con-
trast, attorney and consumer groups usually offer explanations that center on insurers. They argue 
that the insurance industry naturally undergoes fluctuations in its fortunes, a phenomenon called 
the insurance cycle. They point to factors such as decreased investment returns and imprudent 
pricing decisions by insurers as factors that trigger the onset of unfavorable swings in the market. 
What characterizes the arguments of all of these groups is that they stress that either claims costs 
or insurance industry factors have driven the crisis, not both. The best evidence suggests that to 
the contrary, the crisis has been driven to some degree by both of these phenomena, and that 
they may be interrelated.
Studies of litigation costs should be interpreted carefully in light of several mea-
surement issues. When interpreting analyses of trends in claim severity and claims frequency, 
these issues should be taken into consideration (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Measurement issues in analyzing trends in claim severity and claims frequency
Measure Measurement issue
Award amounts Award amounts should be adjusted for inflation using a general inflation measure such 
as the GDP inflator.
Claims frequency Claims frequency data should be adjusted for the number of practicing physicians by 
expressing them as the number of claims per physician.
Claim severity vs. 
insurer losses
Claim severity and insurer losses are different measures and cannot be used inter-
changeably. Claim severity figures show the average payment per paid claim, based 
on data about specific claims. Insurer loss data describe the insurer’s total expected 
or actual payouts. When losses go up, it could be because of higher claim severity, 
higher claims frequency, or both. 
One type of insurer loss statistic, called incurred losses, represents the insurer’s esti-
mate of its total liability for claims relating to that year, not the amount it actually paid. 
The estimate may prove inaccurate.
Jury verdict 
amounts
Jury awards may not represent what an insurer actually pays in a case because many 
verdicts are later reduced. Also, average jury verdict amounts are not representative of 
average settlement amounts.
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Rising claims costs—driven by an increase in average payouts not claims 
frequency—have contributed to rising premiums, but do not explain the sudden 
spike in premiums around 1999–2000.
The hypothesis that increased claims costs have contributed to the recent increases in premi-
ums and insurer exits is supported by several academic studies as well as a 2004 report by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (22, 23, 28, 31). These factors, however, do not 
appear to have as much explanatory power for the current crisis as for the crises of the mid-1970s 
and mid-1980s, which were driven by surges in both claims frequency and claim severity. 
Figure 5 illustrates trends in the average severity of paid claims using National Practitioner Data 
Bank data reported in a recent study (14). The National Practitioner Data Bank collects mandatory 
insurer reports of all malpractice claims on which a payment was made on behalf of physician 
defendants. The study found that the average severity of paid claims has increased since 1991; 
however, the rate of growth did not increase during the malpractice crisis period. Total growth in 
severity was 52 percent in real terms for the entire study period (1991–2003), but only six percent 
between 2000 and 2003. The increase would be much higher (88 percent) if the figures were not 
adjusted for inflation (13). Although the top ten percent of awards have grown more in absolute 
dollar terms, the highest rate of growth has actually been in medium-sized awards. These find-
ings suggest that the burden of claims costs on insurers is growing over time, but did not spike 
around the time malpractice insurance premiums began to rise rapidly. Hence, other factors 
probably influenced the recent sharp increases in premiums. 
Figure 5. Amount of average paid claim, 1991–2003
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank data reported in Chandra et al., 2005. All dollar values are adjusted to 2003 dollars.
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The national claim severity figure masks substantial state-to-state variations. A 
study of closed claims in Florida found that average severity among paid claims increased signifi-
cantly between 1999 and 2003 (34). In contrast, a study of Texas closed claims found that severity 
among “large” paid claims (payments greater than $25,000 in 1988 dollars) was essentially flat 
over the 1999–2002 period—before the state’s damages caps were instituted (7). Although these 
studies are not directly comparable because the Texas study excluded small payments, the results 
are strongly indicative of variations across states.1 
With regard to claims frequency, there is no evidence that an increase in the 
number of malpractice claims has contributed to the current malpractice insur-
ance crisis. The Data Bank study found no significant nationwide increase in the number of paid 
claims between 1991 and 2003 after adjusting for population changes (Figure 6). These findings 
are corroborated by state-specific studies. A study of two counties in Illinois in the 1994 –2004 
period similarly found no upward trend in frequency after adjusting for changes in the number of 
physicians (33). Likewise, the aforementioned Florida study found no increase in the number of 
paid claims from 1999 to 2003 after adjusting for growth in the number of doctors (34) and the 
Texas study found that per-physician claims frequency actually declined from 1999 to 2002 (7). 
Figure 6. Trends in per-capita frequency of paid malpractice claims, 1991–2003
Source: National Practitioner Data Bank data reported in Chandra et al., 2005; population data obtained by personal communica-
tion with the author of that report; and physician supply data from the Bureau of Health Professions Area Resource File. 
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1 Including small payments would likely have only a modest effect on the average.
The statistical relationship between insurers’ claims payments and malpractice 
premiums is weakly positive. To understand the contribution of claims payments to the 
malpractice crisis, it is useful to understand the relationship between insurer losses and premiums. 
Insurers say that their pricing decisions are driven by their forecasts of liability costs in the period 
covered by the policy. Actuaries forecast these costs based on historical loss data as well as their 
knowledge of relevant environmental factors in the coming period, such as new tort reforms.  
This account of how policies are rated suggests that premiums should closely track insurer  
losses, assuming the actuarial estimates are reasonably accurate.
Some stakeholder groups, however, dispute this account, claiming that premium increases bear no 
association with trends in losses. They have prepared descriptive analyses suggesting that losses 
have been stable over the past several years while premiums have gone up (1). Some of these 
reports have only looked at paid losses, leading insurers to object that incurred losses (the total 
amount the insurer expects to pay once all claims for which it has exposure have been brought and 
closed) are a better measure. Additionally, some of these reports have only looked at the largest 
companies (3), which may not be representative of the experiences and practices of all companies. 
A recent study using data on claims payments from 1992 to 2002 from the National Practitioner 
Data Bank is interesting for its lack of significant findings (4). The study examined the statistical 
association between payments and premiums by estimating a regression model in which pay-
ments were the only explanatory variable. The regression coefficient for the payments variable was 
positive, but did not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Of note, none of these analyses controls for other factors that may influence premiums. They 
simply examine the association between payments or losses and premiums. The lack of a strong 
statistical relationship suggests that other variables are also influential.
The insurance cycle has contributed to the current crisis. Insurance markets undergo 
periodic business cycles. The insurance cycle has been the subject of considerable attention from 
economists, but they still argue about why the cycle occurs (Figure 7). 
At least one expert analysis suggests that decreased investment returns—an element of the insur-
ance cycle—underlies the current crisis (5). But these declines do not explain the magnitude of 
premium increases or their variation across states during the malpractice crisis. Thus, investment 
returns are at best only a partial explanation.
Another strand of the insurance cycle argument relates to insurer pricing decisions. Critics of the  
industry charge that insurers seeking to maximize their business volume priced their policies unrea-
sonably low in the 1980s and 1990s, taking insufficient notice of their potential liability for incurred-
but-not-reported claims. While at lease one study supports this argument (9), it better explains the 
failure of particular companies than increases in prices charged by the remaining companies.
 
The insurance cycle should not be considered in isolation from claims costs as  
an explanation for the malpractice crisis. The two are related. Because of the possi- 
bility that external shocks such as large increases in claims costs contribute to the insurance  
cycle (Figure 7), it is reasonable to see a relationship between insurance cycle and claims costs 
explanations for the malpractice crisis. However, some still present the insurance-cycle as a  
competing explanation. 
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Figure 7. Understanding the insurance cycle
Insurance markets cycle through periods of low prices and ample supply (soft markets) and periods when 
prices are high and supply is tight (hard markets). Soft-market periods are characterized by relatively 
low claims costs and relatively high investment returns. During soft markets, insurers may loosen their 
underwriting standards and lower their prices in order to attract more business. The more premiums they 
collect, the more they are able to invest in favorable stock and bond markets. 
The cycle turns when insurance company actuaries begin to realize that insurers’ financial resources are not 
going to be sufficient to cover their losses. Companies report signs of financial distress, such as inadequate 
reserves and deterioration in the financial ratios that measure profitability. They may raise premiums, adopt 
stricter underwriting standards (turning away physicians they judge to be poor risks), stop taking on any 
new business or threaten to exit the malpractice insurance market altogether. Health care providers become 
alarmed at the decreasing affordability and availability of insurance. The situation typically stabilizes within 
a few years due to some combination of premium increases, reforms that limit insurers’ losses, shifts in the 
amount of market competition or improvements in investment returns. 
Insurance cycles reflect a forecasting error, a gap between what insurers thought their losses would be over 
the short term and what they actually evolved to be. There is disagreement among insurance scholars about 
why forecasting errors occur. A key point of controversy is the extent to which errors stem from external 
shocks to the system, such as an unanticipated industry-wide increase in the frequency or average cost 
of malpractice claims or a downturn in the equity and bond markets. The consequences of such changed 
circumstances can be severe for medical malpractice insurers because of the long tail of malpractice 
claims—the fact that claims often are not filed until 2–3 years after the alleged malpractice occurs. The tail 
problem means that changed assumptions about losses affect not only the claims that have been brought in 
a given year, but also the claims that are yet to come. 
External shocks are believed to lead to a problem called capacity constraint. The amount of capital a 
company holds limits the amount of insurance it can offer at one time, because the company needs to have 
money to put into reserve. It is relatively expensive for companies to raise new capital, so if an insurance 
company loses a lot of capital through a decrease in investment returns or a big increase in claims costs, 
rather than raising new capital it may just decide to offer less insurance. As the supply of insurance shrinks, 
the companies that do offer insurance can charge higher prices without fear of losing out to competitors.
While some scholars believe that it is primarily unforeseen external factors that drive insurance cycles, 
others blame insurance companies. They argue that below-cost prices during soft markets are the result 
of unrealistic and imprudent actuarial assumptions, and that above-cost prices during hard markets reflect 
insurers’ attempts to maximize profits by charging more than is reasonable. These hypotheses are difficult 
to test empirically. There does appear to be a temporal correlation, however, between changes in interest 
rates, changes in litigation costs and the onset of malpractice crises.
In the policy debate over the causes of the malpractice crisis, insurance-cycle explanations are often discussed 
as though they are wholly separate from an alternative explanation, rising litigation costs. But because one 
of the fundamental questions surrounding insurance cycles is the extent to which they are driven by external 
factors such as upswings in claims costs, they shouldn’t be considered mutually exclusive explanations. 
Recommended reading: (5, 23, 27) 
There is evidence that each of these drivers has played a role. The most reasonable 
conclusion suggested by the evidence is that increased claims costs, inadvised insurer business 
decisions, decreased investment returns and other insurance-market dynamics have all con-
tributed to this malpractice crisis. These factors also interact. For instance, both poor business 
decisions and external shocks such as rising litigation costs may contribute to an insurance cycle. 
Genesis stories that focus on just one explanation, or frame the explanations as mutually exclu-
sive, miss the mark.
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